University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Master's Theses

University of Connecticut Graduate School

12-16-2012

Statistical Analysis of the National Basketball
Association's Age Minimum: Financial and
Cultural Outcomes Associated with Collectively
Bargained Draft Eligibility Rules
Joshua A. LaRosa
joshua.larosa@uconn.edu

Recommended Citation
LaRosa, Joshua A., "Statistical Analysis of the National Basketball Association's Age Minimum: Financial and Cultural Outcomes
Associated with Collectively Bargained Draft Eligibility Rules" (2012). Master's Theses. 367.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/gs_theses/367

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Connecticut Graduate School at OpenCommons@UConn. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenCommons@UConn. For more information, please contact
opencommons@uconn.edu.

Statistical Analysis of the National Basketball Association’s Age Minimum:
Financial and Cultural Outcomes Associated with Collectively Bargained Draft
Eligibility Rules

Joshua A. LaRosa
B.S.E, University of Kansas, 2011

A Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
at the
University of Connecticut
2012

APPROVAL PAGE
Master of Arts Thesis

Statistical Analysis of the National Basketball Association’s Age Minimum:
Financial and Cultural Outcomes Associated with Collectively Bargained Draft
Eligibility Rules

Presented by
Joshua LaRosa, B.S.E.

Major Advisor ___________________________________________________________
Jennifer E. Bruening PhD
Associate Advisor ________________________________________________________
Laura J. Burton PhD
Associate Advisor_________________________________________________________
Mansour Ndiaye PhD

University of Connecticut
2012

ii

Acknowledgements
I would first like to acknowledge those who aided in the completion of this project. I was
fortunate to have a graduate faculty advisor in Dr. Jennifer Bruening, who was supportive in my
vision and oversaw this project. A number of other professors played a significant role in
preparing me for this project including Dr. Janet Fink, and Dr. Laura Burton. I also wouldn’t
have had these research opportunities if it were not for the Neag School of Education at the
University of Connecticut. Additionally, I would like to thank my classmates for their support,
feedback and friendship. Our class discussions contributed to this project in numerous ways.

iii

Table of Contents
Introduction......................................................................................................................................6
Literature Review............................................................................................................................8
Theory............................................................................................................................................17
Research Questions........................................................................................................................21
Research Methods..........................................................................................................................22
Research Results............................................................................................................................29
Discussion......................................................................................................................................37
Interpretation of Results.........................................................................................................37
Proposed NBA Improvements................................................................................................41
Research Limitations..............................................................................................................44
Future Research Directions....................................................................................................45
Conclusions....................................................................................................................................47

iv

Abstract
This study is a statistical analysis of drafted players in the National Basketball
Association before and after the 19-year age minimum, implemented as part of the 2005
Collective Bargaining Agreement. These statistical analyses are aimed at determining the effects
that the age minimum has had on both potential draft entrants, as well as the teams that are
making personnel decisions. Research was then narrowed to three primary questions.
1. Have changes to the 2005 CBA, in regards to the age limit, significantly affected the age of
players drafted? How do the average draft, first round, and lottery ages compare before and after
the implementation of the 2005 age limit?
Analysis- The first question resulted in an analysis of the age of drafted players by each of the 14
years surrounding the age minimum. T-tests were used to determine the level of significance of
these relationships.
2. Have changes to the 2005 CBA, in regards to the age limit, influenced additional early
entrants picked in the NBA Draft?
Analysis- The second question resulted in an evaluation of the education of each player drafted
during this same period of time.
3. Have changes to the 2005 CBA, in regards to the age limit, effected the on-court development
of NBA players in the first five years of their careers? Are the rule changes affecting first round
and lottery picks disproportionately?
Analysis- The final questions resulted in a statistical analysis of the on-court contributions of
each of these 14 draft classes.
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Introduction
The National Basketball Association (NBA) has had a long lasting debate over an
acceptable age for its draft entrants. Unlike other professional leagues, the NBA’s eligibility
rules have changed several times over its existence. Teenage players have proven that they can
be highly successful at the NBA level. This has only fueled the debate over player eligibility.
This thesis is an analysis of the draft selections that surrounded the implementation of the 19year age minimum in the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement. This rule change included a
mandatory provision that players must also be at least one calendar year removed from their high
school graduation (2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2009).
The purpose of the research is to explore the effects that the age minimum has had on
several characteristics of the draft pools, as well as the development of the players selected. This
analysis primarily focuses on characteristics like age, education level, as well as each player’s
level of contribution. Before laying out the details of the research methods, findings and
discussion, it is important to have an understanding of the history of the NBA Draft, and the
collectively bargained rules associated with it.
The NBA has an extensive history of serving as the paramount motivator of amateur
basketball players across North America, as well as the rest of the world. The allure of multimillion dollar contracts and the glamour of the “NBA lifestyle” aids in attracting the most
talented basketball prospects. In 1947, the Basketball Association of America, later rebranded
the National Basketball Association, began utilizing the amateur draft to distribute eligible
rookie talent (Berri, Brook & Fenn, 2011). In 1958, the league instituted the reverse order draft.
The purpose of this change was to promote competitive balance, especially among many of the
league’s small market franchises (Berri at al., 2011). At this time, the amateur draft exclusively
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consisted of collegiate players (DatabaseBasketball, 2012). The similarity in age and experience
among these early draft pools minimized the need for additional draft rules.
In 1970, Spencer Haywood challenged the NBA’s previous eligibility requirement of
being at least four-years removed from high school graduation. He did so with the support of
Seattle SuperSonic’s (now Oklahoma City Thunder) owner Sam Schulman. This case was
infamously referred to as Haywood v. National Basketball Assn., 401 U.S. 1204 (1971)(U.S.
Supreme Court, 1971). It ended in a settlement that opened the door for amateur players to apply
for entry into the NBA Draft before their college class reached graduation. Early entrants were
still expected to apply for a “hardship” exemption (Zola, 2012). This “hardship” exemption
created an additional option for many NBA prospects.
Darryl Dawkins leveraged Spencer Haywood’s aforementioned favorable ruling to enter
the draft directly out of Maynard Evans High School (FL). Dawkins was eventually selected as
the fifth overall pick in the 1975 NBA Draft (Basketball-Reference database, 2012). Despite his
successful career, the NBA would go 20 years before another high school basketball player
would apply for entry into the NBA Draft (Basketball-Reference database, 2012). Teams
continued to draft players who had completed at least their junior year of college. These
decisions were in trepidation of signing players whose Marginal Revenue Product (MRP) did not
equal their wages (Groothuis, Hill & Perri, 2007). In 1995, the Minnesota Timberwolves made
Kevin Garnett the fifth pick in the NBA Draft. Garnett’s immediate success convinced NBA
executives that North America’s elite high school talent was finally capable of both competing
and developing at the NBA level (Litman, 2010).
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Literature Review
After Haywood v. National Basketball Assn. was settled, early entrants in the draft rose
from one in 1970 to seven in 1995 (Groothuis et al., 2007). Although some college juniors and
college sophomores experimented with early entry applications, totals were only modestly
increasing (Groothuis et al, 2007). Due to such an insignificant increase, these new entrants had
little economic or social impact. During this 26-year period (1970-1995) the NBA had heavily
invested in developing basketball internationally, and league executives were focused on
collecting the dividends of those foreign projects (Eschker, Perez & Siegler, 2004).
International players had been identified and developed through the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) since the early seventies. Some of the most prominent examples
included Hakeem Olajuwon of Lagos, Nigeria and the University of Houston, Patrick Ewing of
Kingston, Jamaica and Georgetown University, and Detlef Schrempf of Leverkusen, Germany
and University of Washington (Yang & Lin, 2012). In 1985, the selection of Fernando Martin
Espina by the Portland Trail Blazers opened the door for internationally developed foreign talent
(Basketball-Reference database, 2012). Other memorable European based talent that shortly
followed included 1985 draftees Drazen Petrovic of Croatia and Georgi Glouchkov of Bulgaria
(Basketball-Reference database, 2012). In the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), the
franchise owners and National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) agreed on new
arrangements that allowed all players to enter the draft and stay with foreign professional clubs
while their rights remained with the NBA team who selected them (Zola, 2012). This rule change
resulted in an inundation of primarily European and South American talent. The majority of
these players had been developed by foreign professional basketball clubs, as well as specialized
sport academies in Europe and Asia. Unlike college student-athletes, most international
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prospects had not been considered amateur athletes, as they had typically been paid modest
playing wages at young ages.
Currently, the NBA acquires international talent through intercollegiate programs, prep
schools, domestic professional leagues, international basketball academies, foreign professional
clubs and their youth developmental programs. Regardless of where these players develop, they
all must enter the league through the draft. The number of international players in the NBA has
increased from 57 players on the opening-day of the 2000-2001 season to 109 players on the
opening-day of the 2007-2008 season (Chiba, 2012). Based on the opening-day rosters of the
1997-1998 season, international players were being paid more than American players who had
similar on-court performances, personal characteristics and player-team characteristics (Eschker
et al., 2004). The most contemporary research has discovered that international players are
actually being paid less then equally qualified domestic talent (Yang & Lin, 2012). The common
explanation is an example of the “winner’s curse.” NBA teams now have an established system
for scouting internationally and are conservatively investing resources on international prospects.
As the supply of international players continues to rise, and the NBA’s demand for players
remains stable, the NBA will continue to establish market power (Yang & Lin, 2012). The
number of international prospects selected in the NBA Draft has actually decreased by 1.61%
since the institution of the 2005 CBA (Basketball-Reference database, 2012).
The 1983 CBA instituted a team salary cap. This cap was actually below the payroll of
five current teams. Each of these franchises had their payrolls frozen until their player salaries
were able to drop below the new salary cap (Groothuis et al., 2007). This new salary cap,
combined with the subsequent payroll freezes, created an incredibly inconsistent market for
rookie contracts. Some teams had an abundance of salary cap space and as a result could offer
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large rookie contracts. Other teams had frozen payrolls and had little salary cap space to offer
annual draft selections. The disparity led to gross inconsistencies in rookie salaries, and
eventually the creation of the rookie salary scale in the 1995 CBA (Groothuis et al., 2007). Prior
to the implementation of the rookie salary scale, top picks were signing enormous rookie
contracts. For example, in 1994 Glenn Robinson signed a rookie contract worth $68.15 million
over 10 years (Arel & Tomas, 2012).
The institution of the rookie salary scale changed the way amateur student-athletes
approached entry into the NBA. Most research attributes the incorporation of high school draft
entrants to the utilization of a rookie salary scale that the NBA implemented as part of the 1995
CBA. The rookie salary scale provided a predetermined salary slot for every pick in the first
round. Each first round selection was slotted for the first two years of their career (Jessop, 2012).
A third year team option was also included in the scale. Teams can pay rookie players anywhere
from 80 to 120 percent of this predetermined 3-year guaranteed contract. It has become standard
practice that first round picks are offered the salary at 120% of the original value (Johnson,
2012). In 1998, the rookie scale was extended an additional year and the team option was pushed
back to the fourth year. The NBA did this in an attempt to prevent monumental fourth year
salaries like the one that made Kevin Garnett the fourth-highest paid player just his fourth season
in the NBA. Individual salary caps were also implemented in 1998. These changes had a
significant effect on the salary equality in the NBA (Hill & Jolly, 2012). One study found that 59
percent of all players on NBA opening-day rosters in 2009 were in the first five years of their
career (Arel & Tomas, 2012). The actions of top prospects would suggest that they are
compelled to enter the league as soon as possible and reach the open market as early as league
rules will allow.
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The NBPA agreed to many of these changes to the CBA because the new regulations
aided in the creation of a system where the most seasoned players have the highest earning
potential (Groothuis et al., 2007). The additional salary scale year only further encouraged elite
prospects to forgo college eligibility to enter the NBA Draft (Groothuis et al., 2007). After the
implementation of the salary scale, teams were more likely to pick early entrants in the draft.
This contributed to a decrease in the level of investment required to develop these early entrants.
In 2005, this progression continued as the new individual salary cap stated that teams were only
allowed to offer their own free agents a 12.5% raise from their previous years contract, and offer
other teams’ free agents a 10.0% raise from their previous salary (Groothuis et al., 2007). This
rule change had the support of both veteran players and league executives, as it favored players
who choose to stay with their current teams. It was also primarily beneficial to veteran players
(Groothuis et al., 2007). Although Groothius did not study the effects of an age minimum, they
have published studies evaluating other aspects of the CBA. These articles include an evaluation
of the rookie salary scale. Groothius used average draft class age and college experience to
evaluate a contrast between draft results (Groothuis et al., 2007). They also looked at the level of
contribution of players before and after the CBA was implemented (Groothuis et al., 2007).
After these agreements, the number of high school draft entrants escalated rapidly.
Although many of these high school superstars were prepared for the NBA, many required
additional development. Success stories included household names like Kevin Garnett, Kobe
Bryant, LeBron James and Dwight Howard. On the other end of the spectrum, 14 high school
players have entered the NBA Draft and gone un-drafted throughout the entire draft (Groothuis
et al., 2007). Each of these players had to forgo their amateur status. Most of these prospects
would go on to play in foreign leagues or North American minor leagues. Arel and Tomas
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dissected the last five NBA Drafts using a put option analysis; they determined that only
projected top ten picks should enter the draft early (Arel & Tomas, 2012). Most student-athletes
use the 14th pick, last pick of the lottery, as a projected benchmark.
As early entrants continued to go un-drafted, talk of an age-limit began to progress.
Perhaps the most highly anticipated draft day exemption was Lenny Cooke. Cooke was
considered one of the all-time best basketball players from New York City. He entered the 2002
NBA Draft directly out of high school, but went un-drafted through both rounds (BasketballReference database, 2012). Cooke was once considered the top rival of LeBron James. He, and
many others, operated in a world of shoe executives, runners, and agents. This culture devoured
his promise as a prospect, and after several minor leagues, foreign countries and knee injuries,
Cooke’s basketball career ended at 25 years of age. His last stop was the Continental Basketball
Association (CBA), a third-tier professional league in North America (Araton, 2012). In 2005,
David Stern infamously explained that, "Players aren't going to walk away from the pressure and
the promise, and teams aren't going to walk away from the potential. So we (the NBA) wind up
trying to legislate it." (Jenkins, 2005).
The NBA’s most infamous owner, Mark Cuban, echoed these sentiments by saying, “I
just think there’s a lot more kids that get ruined coming out early or going to school trying to be
developed to come out early than actually make it. For every Kobe (Bryant) or (Kevin) Garnett
or Carmelo (Anthony) or LeBron James, there’s 100 Lenny Cookes.” (Shetler, 2012).
The NBA is not alone in the concern that player’s careers are being affected by premature
exposure to the pressures of professional athletics. The World Tennis Association Tour formed
an Age Eligibility Commission in 1994 (Rodenberg & Stone, 2010). This commission led to the
development of a multi-faceted development program. Programs included a “Pro U” and guides
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players on how to minimize the stressors that go along with being a professional tennis player
(Rodenberg & Stone, 2010). They have also implemented a 14-year age minimum from all
professional tournaments. Additional tournament restrictions are placed on teenagers in
ascending order, until they are 18 years old (Rodenberg & Stone, 2010).
In 2006, the NBA and the NBPA re-evaluated eligibility rules. They determined that
eligibility for the draft would start a calendar year from the player’s high school graduation.
They also implemented an age minimum of 19 years of age for all incoming players (Boudway,
2012). These new eligibility rules were aimed at preventing players from entering the draft
directly out of high school. With the exception of Brandon Jennings, who spent the year playing
professionally for Lottomatica Roma in Italy, top domestic talent had continued to develop in
college or the National Basketball Association Development League (D-League). Another high
school star, Latavious Williams competed in the D-League for a year before gaining draft
eligibility. He was later drafted in the second round of the 2010 NBA Draft (BasketballReference database). The overwhelming majority of these elite high school players have gone to
top NCAA basketball programs. Additionally, many student-athletes are leaving after a year or
two.
In the six years prior to the age limit, 134 early entrants were drafted in the first or second
round; 29 of these were high school players. In the six years after the draft rules, 188 early
entrants were drafted in the first or second round of the NBA Draft (Basketball-Reference
database, 2012). This increase in early departures led to an abundance of speculation as to
whether the NBA has had the best interest of the players, coaches, programs and universities in
mind. Statistics like these have led many to question the intentions of the NBA’s age minimum.
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Ever since the 2005 CBA was instituted, playing-time in college basketball has been the
primary motivation behind an increase in player mobility. This increase in the movement of
student-athletes exists despite NCAA rules stating that any division-1 transfer must sit out an
entire year. There are few exemptions to this rule, but some student-athletes are exempt from
sitting out an entire season. These cases occur when student-athletes are provided with a
hardship exemption by the NCAA, or have already graduated from their previous institution and
have chosen to enroll in a graduate program not offered by their previous institution. It has been
estimated that 40 percent of division-1 basketball players have transferred within the first two
years of their college basketball careers (Durando, 2012). This statistic is likely an indication of
the importance of showcasing talent for the NBA Draft. Premier student-athletes are in a rush to
get the four-year rookie scale started. Players are no longer willing to wait for playing time until
their junior or senior years of college. Instead they are more interested in transferring to schools
where they can be the star and showcase their talent. This increase in transfers is beneficial to
players according to Berri, Brook and Fenn’s (2011) research. They suggest NBA teams weight
scoring and individual awards above rebounding, assists and steals when evaluating college
players (Berri et al., 2011).
In recent months, NBA Commissioner David Stern has expressed interest in increasing
the age-minimum to 20 years of age, and at least two years removed from high school
graduation. Some maintain that this was his original intention before negotiating the age
minimum (Wurth, 2004). Many in the media have expressed interest in a system similar to the
one being used by the MLB and NFL. In the MLB, players are free to enter the draft out of high
school, but must stay in college at least three years before regaining eligibility into the MLB
Draft (Wolverton. 2007).

14

Many feel that this proposed age limit is part of a larger league strategy. They feel that
the NBA is implementing these rule changes to clean up their image (Aschburner, 2012). The
NBA has a long history of collectively bargained rule changes with image as their primary
motivation. One of the most recent examples was the implementation of a dress code before and
after league games. NBA Commissioner David Stern even admitted that image was a factor in
the creation of an age-minimum in 2005 (Araton, 2005). Alternatively, he continues to assert that
the rule changes were business decisions regarding player development.
It should be noted that what works for the NCAA is not necessarily what is best for the
NBA. Any changes to the NBA’s CBA will be in the best financial interests of the NBA. In
2009, David Stern said, "This is not about the NCAA. This is not an enforcement of some social
program. This is a business decision by the NBA. We like to see our players in competition after
high school," when discussing the 19-year-old age minimum (Garcia, 2009). Although
everybody seems to have an opinion of the NBA’s age minimum, most opinions and claims lack
statistical based analysis.
When the age limit was collectively bargained in 2005, the goal was to cut down on
development costs and reduce the gamble that was associated with drafting premier talent.
Kwame Brown, who was selected as the number one overall pick in 2001, never amounted to be
anything but a bench player. Kwame became the poster-child for the age limit. Maturity concerns
plagued Brown’s career and even resulted in numerous suspensions in his first three years
(Jenkins, 2005). Brown’s suspension in combination with repeated legal problems led to
speculation about his level of maturity. As exemplified in the Washington Wizards’ selection of
Brown in the 2001 NBA Draft, one missed draft pick can substantially affect the future success
of an NBA organization. The Portland Trail Blazers’ selection of Greg Oden, in 2007, proved
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that uncertainty would be present in the draft regardless of the age limit. When Greg Oden was a
senior in high school, an anonymous NBA general manager said, “I’d sign him today. He’d be
on the floor tomorrow” (Deveney, 2006). Under the previous rules, Oden would have been
eligible to enter the NBA directly out of high school. Instead, he played one year of basketball at
Ohio State University before being selected first overall in the 2007 NBA Draft. Oden would
rarely see the floor in the NBA due to continual knee problems, seeing minutes in only 82 games
after four seasons. Disappointing draft selections like this extend far beyond the value of wasted
assets. Challenging young players often threatens the stability of hierarchy among team
members. Research shows that this threat can greatly affect a team’s productivity on the court
(Halevy, Chou, Galinsky & Murnighan, 2012). Poor performance on the court can lead to a poor
front office performance. Oklahoma City Thunder superstar Kevin Durant was selected with the
second pick in 2007, behind Oden. He recently led the Oklahoma City Thunder to the 2012 NBA
Finals. He is widely regarded as one of the best players in the NBA, and has led the league in
scoring three years in a row (Basketball-Reference database, 2012). The NBA has designed the
reverse order draft to give the least successful teams the highest picks. Drafting a player like
Greg Oden over a player like Kevin Durant can set a team back for years. A franchise’s success
rate with these top picks is crucial to their overall success as an organization.
The NBA also saw the age minimum as an opportunity to increase both the physical and
mental maturity of its eligible draft pool. This rule was successful in that teams are able to
evaluate a potential prospect’s performance in college, or other professional leagues. The number
of first round picks whose team options were picked up illustrates this benefit. Team options are
in the 4th year of the rookie salary scale. Teams have control over whether or not they are
interested in exercising these options. Since the rule change, either the team who drafted them or
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another who had since acquired their contracts, tendered an average of 23 of these 30 first round
picks’ options. This average compares favorably to the seven years prior to the rule change in
which an average of 21.42 of the fourth-year options were tendered (Basketball-Reference
database, 2012).
It was anticipated that the age minimum would be addressed during 2012 CBA
negotiations. The owners instead prioritized the distribution of the Basketball Related Income
(BRI), making the age limit a “B-list” issue (Hill & Jolly, 2012). By the time the NBPA and
owners reached an agreement on A-list issues, they were already several weeks into the NBA
schedule (Berri, 2012). In an attempt to end the lockout promptly, none of the B-list issues were
extensively negotiated as part of the new agreement. The NBPA was unwilling to adjust the age
limit without further salary cap concessions from the league office (Associated Press, 2012).
Franchise owners and leagues executives did not want to further prolong the start of the season.

Theory
Theory of Reasoned Action
The decisions of potential NBA selections tend to be influenced by numerous individual
factors. The combinations of these factors all contribute to the prospect’s eventual behavior as to
whether or not he will enter the draft. The theoretical framework of this behavior is similar to the
Theory of Reasoned Action, which is typically used to identify the factors that go into personal
behaviors. Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen developed the Theory of Reasoned Action in 1975.
Its purpose was to predict human social behavior (Roberto, Murray-Johnson & Witte, 2011).
NBA prospects take many of the same factors into account when making draft entry decisions.
For example, a person’s self-efficacy and attitude toward behavior contribute to their behavioral
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intention. This behavioral intention combined with current descriptive norms; result in an
individual’s eventual decision (Roberto et al., 2011). The exact structure for these draft-entry
decisions is not uniform throughout all professional sports. The framework is affected by some
of the specific characteristic of each sport and league.
For example, in this scenario a student-athlete’s self-efficacy includes his personal beliefs
and self-identification as a player who is talented enough to be effective in the NBA. It also
includes his personal confidence that his skills, talent level and physical characteristics will
effectively translate into success (Hollenbeck & Hall, 2004). This is a factor that typically stirs
up debates in the months leading up to the draft. Teams, media and fans often question whether
certain players can be as effective as they were in college due to a lack of size, strength, and
versatility. Numerous players have been selected after disappointing college careers, because
general managers, owners and coaches feel that their physical attributes are more suited for the
NBA. Not all college superstars are projected NBA selections (Eisenberg, 2012).
As part of this framework, it is important to note that not all players want to enter the
NBA as early as they can. Some student-athletes have different goals, like education, family,
other careers, military service, or civic duties. Attitudes toward entering the draft are different
among all draft prospects, student-athletes included. Early entry candidates often face the
decision of whether to enter the draft early, or return to their school or international club for at
least another year, in order to raise their draft value. At times, players enter the draft knowing
that their “stock” is unlikely to reach the same level. Each of these social factors influences a
player’s behavior intention regarding whether or not to move foreword with entering the draft.
This behavioral intention is based on the belief that the action will lead to favorable
consequences (Ryan & Bonfield, 1975).
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Figure 1. Theory of Reasoned Action

Presented above is the proposed research model. Elements of this model were taken from a decomposed Theory
of Reasoned Action that was aimed at explaining intention to use Internet stock trading among Malaysian
Investors (Ramayah, Rouibah, Gopi & Rangel, 2009).

The third and most fluid factor is the normative beliefs about entering the draft.
Normative beliefs can be defined as, “a person’s subjective probability that a particular
normative referent wants the person to perform a given behavior” (Ajzen, 2012). Normative
beliefs also include injunctive and descriptive norms (Ajzen, 2012). Injunctive norms come from
inferring what other important individuals want the individual to do, and descriptive norms are
the observed or inferred actions of important social referents (Ajzen, 2012). Injunctive norms
primarily focus on the evaluation of acceptable behavior. In the example of NBA prospects,
injunctive norms come from the decisions of general managers, scouts, coaches and owners who
have shaped what is considered acceptable draft entry behavior. Descriptive norms are primarily
base on the opinions of those around a prospect; this includes family, friends, peers and fans. In
this context, descriptive norms would come from past and present peer prospect decisions, and
the outcomes that followed these decisions.
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For many years, these factors were the primary contributors to early entry decisions, but
in 2006, the age minimum emerged in the model. The age minimum has prevented some players
who would otherwise apply for early entry to take alternative pathways to the NBA.
Institution Theory
Although the Theory of Reasoned Action effectively illustrates the decision making
process of NBA prospects evaluating early entry, the draft rule itself is the product of a business
process that is constantly evolving in order to provide a more effective and efficient property for
its primary stakeholders. This business process is best described using Institutional Theory.
The Institutional Theory states that organizations must be continually evolving in order to
survive. This evolution must include both structural and procedural aspects of the organization.
The primary variables include both the internal and external environments. Organizations tend to
adopt structures, procedures, or ideas based, not on efficiency, but rather on external definitions
of legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional strategy is not as concerned with gaining
competitive advantage based on institutional structures as it is concerned with managing those
structures, and preserving or transforming institutional standards and rules in order to establish
favorable conditions (Lawrence, 1999). Institutional control can develop unintentional and
intentional strategies. In the case of the NBA’s age minimums, owners and league executives
have exercised intentional strategies to combat the external environment that has resulted in high
school entrants reaching an all-time high in the 2005 draft class (Basketball-Reference, 2012).
Although it seems trivial, the NBA is strategically collectively bargaining rules that will benefit
the franchises and its bottom line. The NBA commissioner, David Stern, and his team are always
going to bargain on behalf of the owners.
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The primary goal of ownership is to continue enhance the long
long-term
term success of the
league. The institutionalization process plays
lays a key role in the goal, and has influenced the
approach that they have taken in regard to talent development.
Figure 2. The Effect of Institutionalization Processes on Long
Long-term Success

The chart above illustrates how the institutional process affects long
long-term
term success in organizations
like the NBA (Fleck, 2007). Note: Necessary condition is abbreviated as NC.

Research Questions
The first two research questions have been designed following the tenets of the Theory of
Reasoned Action,
on, and how it relates to early entry decision among NBA prospects. The final
question is an evaluation of the on
on-court
court effects of the institutional changes in regards to age
eligibility rules that are new to the 2005 CBA. The first two questions examine a contrast
between prospect behaviors before and after the age
age-minimum
m was implemented, keeping in
mind that a barrier has been implemented to the Theor
Theory
y of Reasoned Action model. These
questions were designed to identify the effects of this barrier
barrier. The
he third question was designed to
monitor the on-court
ourt effects of the ins
institutional change of the age minimum.
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a. Have changes to the 2005 CBA, in regards to the age limit, significantly affected the age
of players drafted? How do the average draft, first round, and lottery ages compare before
and after the 2005 age limit implementation?
b. Have changes to the 2005 CBA, in regards to the age limit, influenced additional early
entrants selected in the NBA Draft?
c. Have changes to the 2005 CBA, in regards to the age limit, affected the on-court
development of NBA players in the first five years of their careers? Are the rule changes
affecting first round and lottery picks disproportionately?

Research Methods
Question 1
The first step was to compare the average age of players drafted in both the seven years
before the implementation of the age minimum and in the seven years after the implementation
of the age minimum. A fourteen-year period was chosen based on what many would consider to
be the modern era of the NBA (Hoopedia, 2012). This era is often referred to as the post-Jordan
era because it began on the heels of Michael Jordan’s retirement from the Chicago Bulls in 1998
(Hoopedia, 2012). This era has been identified for numerous rule changes, cultural and political
turmoil and a decrease in TV ratings often attributed to the decline of the NBA’s image. Some
felt that the poor public perception created during this era was a result of younger draft entrants.
David Stern and other league executives started to site maturity as one of the primary
reasons for eligibility rule changes. Although an additional year of college is likely to add to the
mental maturity of early entry prospects, this statistical analysis was set up to examine whether
or not the rule was causing NBA franchises to draft older players. The thought is that researching
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these decisions best identifies the motives of owners and league executives. In this case, their
decisions are the players that they are choosing to draft. Keep in mind that teams can only draft
players that have entered the draft.
To identify any age changes that can be attributed to the institution of the age minimum,
databases were made for each of the last 14 NBA Drafts. The draft position, name, and date of
birth (DOB) of each player were included in this database (www.basketball-reference.com). The
average DOB of each individual draft class was then identified. This DOB was then calculated
converted into the average age, in days, by using a date differential function. This function was
then used to calculate the total number of days between the average DOB and the player’s
respective draft date. Next, an average of the seven drafts that occurred prior to the age limit
(1999-2005) was taken, as well as an average for the seven drafts that occurred after the age limit
(2006-2012). These data were also aligned sequentially for the purpose of identifying trends,
especially during the years surrounding the 2005 CBA. The functions were then repeated for
both first round picks, as well as lottery picks for the purpose of consistency in this statistical
analysis. This array of data will allow for a determination as to whether or not the rule change
has had more of an effect on the average ages in the beginning of the draft, or if change is
consistent throughout the draft.
Next any inconsistencies in the data were identified. Although the draft is always held in
late July, it tends to fall on a different day of the month. This date differential could have
potentially contributed to some variation in the data. To counterbalance this, results were
adjusted by determining the average variation of the draft dates. With this in mind, the 19992005 draft dates were taken and averaged. This process was repeated for the 2006-2012 draft
dates. The 1999-2005 average draft date was then subtracted from the 2006-2012 average date.
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This provided the difference attributed to varying draft dates. This total was then added to the
average age change of each player.
The draft age of each player was also used to calculate the mean and standard deviation
of both the pre and post rule change groups. I then used these variables, along with the degrees of
freedom to calculate the significance of the age change. I repeated this process from lottery
picks, first round selections, and the entire draft.
Question 2
As part of the next statistical analysis, the distribution and trend of each grade-level, as
well as high school and international draft entrants needed to be investigated. Before gathering
this data, significant CBA changes which have been affecting the behavior of top high school,
college and international basketball prospects were identified. The total number of both drafted
and un-drafted players from 1976-2012 was then found. Next, it was determined that the focus
and data entry would be narrowed to the last 14 drafts.
The total number of picks in each draft has changed over the last 14 years. These
inconsistencies were a result of league expansion and probation (Basketball-Reference database,
2012). In order to accurately compare these distributions, the numbers needed to be standardized.
For the purpose of this analysis, converting the distributions into percentages standardized the
numbers. The class distributions were then divided by the total number of selections in each
respective draft class. After that, an average of the 1999-2005 and the 2006-2012 distributions
for each individual age group were calculated. Players were divided into several categories,
including high school, freshman, sophomore, junior, senior, and international prospects.
It is important to note that players who did not go to college and instead played in other
professional leagues were designated as international players and international players who went
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through the college system where designated with their college classmates. This statistical
analysis should not be used as a measure of international entrants, but instead a measure of the
level of education, in years, achieved before forgoing their amateur status in order to enter the
draft.
Next, the 1999-2005 distribution percentages were subtracted from the 2006-2012
distribution percentages. This change was then multiplied by the current draft size (60 picks).
This gave the standardized change following the implementation of the age limit. Results are
expressed as if each draft had a total of 60 picks.
Question 3
The third research question that was investigated aimed at determining the effect that the
age minimum has had on the development of first round picks in the first five years of their
careers. In an attempt to gather this information, a database was created for each of the last 14
draft classes. For each player drafted in the first round of a given year, the school, team, age,
education level, minutes and salary accumulated in each of the first five years of the player’s
career was documented. It was determined that it was important to measure this development
through contributions to the players’ respective teams. A focus was put on three key criteria that
would indicate that a first round pick had reached a level of participation and contribution that
would raise their marginal revenue product (MRP) above the salary as slotted in the rookie salary
scale. Once a player reached one of the following benchmarks, it was concluded that their
development had reached a level of contribution that would exceed their wages. These three
benchmarks included:
a. Starting more than half of the teams games, with a minimum of 32 games played,
b. Playing 25 minutes per game (MPG), with a minimum of 32 games played,
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or
c. Scoring 15 points per game, with a minimum of 32 games played.
For the purpose of this research question, statistics that define a player’s contribution
were identified. Minutes played, points per game, and percentage of games started were chosen
as the key statistics. These variables were chosen as they reflect the readiness of a player to
contribute at an NBA level. If a young player is not exceeding league averages in these three
categories, they are not contributing to the on court success of their teams, and as a result are not
living up to the earning allotted for first round picks by the rookie salary scale.
These three statistical criteria were strategically placed above league averages. The first
was determined by simply dividing five, the number of starting players, by 12, the number of
active players on each NBA team. This amounts to an average of nearly 41.7% of games started.
Once again the threshold was set above the league average, at 50% of games that the player
participated in started. This was a logical benchmark, as a player who starts more than half of the
team’s games, would be considered a “starter” which carries a significant level of importance in
the NBA. This classification is made clear by the rules for the sixth man of the year vote, as
eligible participants must come off the bench more games then they start (Ginobili Wins…,
2012).
The second threshold was the average minutes played per game. This was calculated by
dividing the total number of minutes per game multiplied by five, for the number of players on
the court. This total was then divided by 12, the number of active players on the roster for each
team. This simple arithmetic expressed that NBA players play an average of 20 minutes per
game. Then it was determined that a significant level of contribution for a first round pick would
exceed the league average. A 25-minute per game average was determined to be an effective
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threshold that would represent a high level of contribution to an NBA team. Between 154 and
180 players reached this threshold annually between the 2005-2006 and the 2010-2011 NBA
seasons, meaning that an average of between 5.1 and 6 players on each team would exceed this
threshold (Sortable Individual Statistics Database, 2012). This statistic was implemented to
account for non-starters that were still contributing amongst their team’s top players.
The third threshold derived from a calculation of the average points scored per game. The
total number of points scored in the 2010-2011 season was taken and divided by 360, the number
of active players in the NBA at any given time. The total number of players, 680.25, was then
divided by 82, the number of games in an NBA season. Results showed that on average, a player
would score 8.30 points per game. Due to the fact that the top players in the NBA score the
majority of the points, 8.3 seemed like a very low average. I only wanted to capture the players
who were not playing at least 25 minutes, or starting half their team’s games, but were still
carrying enough of the scoring load that they would be considered one of their teams top
contributors. A threshold of 15.0 points per game was set, as in most seasons; this places players
among the top 60 scorers in the league. This means that this player will likely be one of the top
two scorers on an NBA roster.
Once these three criteria were set, each first round draft pick was classified into
categories based on age. These categories were high school entrants and international players
under the age of 19, all players under the age of 20, and all players over the age of 20. These
three age groups were chosen to aid in comparing the effects of the 19 year-old age minimum.
Ultimately an under-20 age category was chosen in order to effectively evaluate the effects of a
potential 20 year-old age limit. It is important to note that the under-20 age category includes
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every player from the under-19 age category. These results will help develop methods for future
research by identifying the success of each age group.
Next, the year in which each first round draft pick surpassed one of the three milestones
mentioned above was identified. Then the annual salaries that had been paid to each first round
selection in the subsequent years of their career were added. This sum of annual salaries was
taken and both added and averaged by age category for the first round of each draft. The result of
this function provide the average amount of money a team can expect to spend on a first-round
draft pick in that age group before a selected player reaches the contribution qualifications that
were set above. A calculation of the ratio of players in each age group that reached the
milestones provided in their first five years following their draft date was also provided. This
process was repeated for each first round draft class from 1999 to 2007. The same 14 draft
classes were examined, but five seasons of data was not available for the draft classes between
2007 and 2012. For this reason, they were omitted from the analysis.
Next an average of those totals, averages and ratios for each age group was calculated.
The 1999-2005 first round draft class data, and the 2006-2007 first round draft class data was
then separated. This separation point was used in order to provide a “before and after” contrast
surrounding the institution of the 19-year age minimum in 2005. The 2006-2007-sample size is
relatively small, as only two draft classes have had five years of experience in the NBA. After
completing these calculations, the same procedure was repeated for lottery picks (picks 1-14).
The purpose of this calculation was to determine whether the trends in development were the
same throughout the first round of the draft. It was important to find out if draft position was also
a factor.
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It is also important to note that only years of experience that occurred during the five
years immediately following the draft were included. If the NBA was not paying a player during
any or all of these seasons, the salary totals were excluded from the analysis. For example, many
players were drafted, but decided to stay overseas for one or more seasons. These players did not
receive salaries from NBA teams during these seasons. If one of these players later came to the
NBA within five years of their draft date, these years and salaries were included in the analysis.

Results
Question 1
The findings concluded that the average age of a player drafted from 1999-2005 was 21
years, and 6 months old. Players drafted between 2006-2012 were an average age of 21 years, 6
months and 7 days old. After subtracting these dates, it was found that the 2006-2012 drafts
produced players that were an average of seven days older on their respective draft day before
considering the variation of draft dates.
The 2006-2012 draft dates were an average of two days earlier then the draft dates from
1999-2005. After adding these additional two days to the seven-day difference, it was found that
the average age of incoming drafted players has increased by only nine days after the
implementation of the age minimum.
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Table 1
Average Age by Draft Class
Year

Entire Draft

First Round

Lottery Picks

1999

22 Years, 1 Month, and 6 Days

21 Years, 3 Months, and 10 Days

21 Years, 1 Month, and 6 Days

2000 21 Years, 10 Months, and 4 Days

21 Years, 6 Months, and 3 Days

21 Years, 2 Months, and 5 Days

2001 21 Years, 2 Months, and 11 Days

20 Years, 7 Months, and 20 Days

20 Years, 2 Months, and 24 Days

21 Years, 7 Months, and 3 Days

21 Years, and 22 Days

2003 21 Years, 2 Months, and 25 Days

20 Years, 11 Months, and 22 Days

20 Years, 9 Months, and 6 Days

2004 21 Years, 3 Months, and 18 Days

20 Years, 6 Months, and 19 Days

20 Years, 3 Months, and 12 Days

2005 21 Years, 11 Months, and 23 Days 20 Years, 11 Months, and 14 Days

20 Years, 4 Months, and 12 Days

2002

21 Years, and 10 Months

Avg.

21 Years, 6 Months

21 Years, and 27 Days

20 Years, 8 Months, and 16 Days

2006

21 Years, 6 Months, and 5 Days

21 Years, 0 Months, and 28 Days

21 Years, 3 Months, and 11 Days

2007

21 Years, 8 Months, and 1 Day

21 Years, and 29 Days

20 Years, 8 Months, and 20 Days

2008 21 Years, 3 Months, and 30 Days

20 Years, 4 Months, and 28 Days

20 Years, 4 Months, and 2 Days

21 Years, 8 Months, and 27 Day

21 Years, 2 Months, and 26 Days

20 Years, 10 Months, and 29 Days

21 Years, and 2 Months

20 Years, 8 Months, and 12 Days

2009

2010 21 Years, 6 Months, and 12 Days
2011

21 Years, 4 Months, and 2 Days

20 Years, 9 Months, and 24 Days

20 Years, 4 Months, and 30 Days

2012

21 Years, 6 Months, and 5 Days

20 Years, 8 Months, and 18 Days

20 Years, 3 Months, and 8 Days

Avg.

21 Years, 6 Months, and 7 Days

20 Years, 11 Months, and 11 Days

20 Years, 7 Months, and 28 Days

Diff.

+7 Days

-43 Days

-18 Days

Adj.

+9 Days

-41 Days

-16 Days

Note. Data collected from Basketball-Reference.com
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Using these very same methods, findings concluded that first-round picks actually got an
average of 45 days younger after the rule changes in the 2005 CBA. Similarly, lottery picks were
an average of 16 days younger after the age minimum was implemented. As expected, the early
selections were more effected by the age minimum. This result was consistent in the data for
both before and after the age minimum was implemented. The average age for lottery picks after
the age limit was 21 years, 6 months, and 7 days, while first-round selections were an average of
20 years, 11 months, and 11 days and lottery picks were an average age of 20 years, 7 months
and 28 days old on their respective draft day.
One key factor that cannot be ignored is the trend of younger draft selections even before
the implementation of the age minimum. High school entrants had reached an all-time high in
2005. Sophomore and junior selections reached the third-highest total of all time. This was also
the youngest collective draft of all time. It is not unrealistic to assume that this trend would have
continued if the age limit were not implemented. This data suggests that the age minimum could
have been the only thing preventing continuously younger NBA Drafts. This could be a result of
drafts that may have otherwise been much younger.
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Table 2
Significance of Age Change
Draft Section

P

t

df

Significance

Lottery Picks

0.79

.26

194

Not Significant

First Round

0.58

.55

411

Not Significant

Entire Draft

0.81

.24

825

Not Significant

Note. Data collected from Basketball-Reference.com

Question 2
The findings suggest that the age minimum has resulted in an additional 10.89 early entry
candidates drafted each year. The data shows an average decrease of 4.57 high school players
selected. This change was anticipated, as high school players are no longer eligible for
immediate entry into the NBA draft. This decrease was reflected in an addition of 4.63 freshmen
early entrants selected per draft. Sophomore and junior entrants were also selected more
frequently after the implementation of the age minimum. Sophomore selections grew by an
average of 2.95 picks, as junior selections grew by an average of 3.31 picks per draft. Senior
selections decreased by an average of 5.35 selections per draft. International picks also decreased
by an average of .97 selections per draft. This change can be seen as an independent
phenomenon from the early entry rules. This modest decrease can be attributed to the “winners
curse” explanation that was studied by Yang & Lin (2012). The “winner’s curse” suggests that
although the supply of international players has continued to increase, the demand for players
has remained constant, resulting in a plateau in international selections.
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The second, and more complicated, deviation is the addition of 6.26 sophomore and
junior picks per draft in place of 5.35 seniors and .97 International picks.
Question 3
Results show that teenage first round picks are more likely to reach these benchmarks
than they were before the age limit was instituted. The rate of first round picks reaching these
benchmarks’ rose from 71.15% to 75.00%, an increase of 3.85%. The league is paying an
average of $33,623.23 per player more before selections are reaching the benchmarks, but is
investing an average of $7,222,154.48 less per year on teenage first round picks who have not
yet reached any of these contribution benchmarks.
Lottery picks reflected similar changes, as teenage lottery picks are reaching these
benchmarks in the five years following their respective draft at 88.89%, opposed to the 80.65%
in the years before the rule change. On average, teams are actually spending $530,181.72 less on
players who have not yet reached any of these statistical thresholds. The league is saving an
average of $4,796,510.78 per year on teenage players who are producing under these statistical
benchmarks.
The age limit seems to have had the opposite effect on players who are drafted in their
twenties. The number of first round draftees who reached one of these statistics during the first
five years of their career declined from 62.59% to 52.08%. As a result, teams are spending an
average of $1,059,676.95 more before these players are reaching these contribution benchmarks.
Teams are spending an average of $39,095,915.78 more per draft on first round draftees that are
in their twenties and have not reached any of these contribution statistics.
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Similarly, 68.42% of lottery picks in their twenties are reaching at least one of these
statistics in the first five years of their careers, compares to 79.10% before the rule change.
Teams were spending an average of $190,107.04 more on these players before they are reaching
one of these benchmarks, and an average of $15,242,897.90 more invested in under-achieving
players per year.
The Under-19 age group, which is no longer eligible for the draft, was actually reaching
these contribution benchmarks at 71.43%. This was the highest of any of these first round age
groups. Under-19 lottery picks were reaching the benchmarks at 76.47%, which was the lowest
of any age group.
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Table 3

First Round Picks Reaching Significant Levels of Contribution
Draft

Under-19

Under-20

Over-20

1999

1 of 3

4 of 7

7 of 11

2000

2 of 2

2 of 3

17 of 26

2001

3 of 4

5 of 7

11 of 21

2002

1 of 1

5 of 6

12 of 22

2003

4 of 5

7 of 9

14 of 20

2004

7 of 8

10 of 13

11 of 16

2005

2 of 5

4 of 7

15 of 23

Total

20 of 28

37 of 52

87 of 139

Before Percentage

71.43%

71.15%

62.59%

2006

-

3 of 3

11 of 27

2007

-

6 of 9

14 of 21

Total

0 of 0

9 of 12

25 of 48

After Percentage

0.00%

75.00%

52.08%

Note. Data collected from Basketball-Reference.com
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Table 4

Lottery Picks Reaching Significant Levels of Contribution
Draft

Under-19

Under-20

Over-20

1999

0 of 1

2 of 4

8 of 10

2000

1 of 1

1 of 1

9 of 13

2001

3 of 4

4 of 5

7 of 9

2002

1 of 1

5 of 5

8 of 9

2003

2 of 2

4 of 4

10 of 10

2004

4 of 5

6 of 8

4 of 6

2005

2 of 3

3 of 4

7 of 10

Total

13 of 17

25 of 31

53 of 67

Before Percentage

76.47%

80.65%

79.10%

2006

-

2 of 2

8 of 12

2007

-

6 of 7

5 of 7

Total

0 of 0

8 of 9

13 of 19

After Percentage

0.00%

88.89%

68.42%

Note. Data collected from Basketball-Reference.com
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Discussion
Interpretation of Results
After a review of the first questions results, it is safe to say that this barrier has not
produced a more mature talent pool. There were no statistically significant changes for any
portion of the draft pool. It seems that there are two primary reasons for this. The first is that
some of the top NBA prospects are reclassifying while in high school. They are skipping what
would be their senior year of high school to play a single year of college basketball before
gaining eligibility to enter the NBA Draft. Typically, these players are spending this year at prep
schools that are primarily known for their basketball programs. They play extended seasons and
national schedules. Most players then follow their national high school schedule by missing
months of school playing a national Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) schedule. These are
basically regional all-star teams that travel the country playing in numerous tournaments and
showcases that are put on by college programs, or shoe companies like Nike, Adidas or Under
Armor. As a result of this trend, many elite prospects are entering the NBA at the same age that
they otherwise would have if the age minimum had not been collectively bargained. St. Thomas
Moore’s Andre Drummond, St. Mark’s Alex Murphy, New Hampton Prep’s Noah Vonleh and
The Tilton School’s Nerlens Noel among many others have recently exhibited examples of this
type of high school reclassification. These prospects were all considered top-ten recruits in their
high school classes by numerous recruiting and prep sports publications. Each of these schools
currently competes in the New England Preparatory School Athletic Council (NEPSAC). Many
of these schools recruit and attract top basketball prospects from all over the country. NEPSAC
student-athletes are typically local standouts who leave public high schools before their junior
and senior years in search of more competition and exposure. These schools also specialize in the
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creation of post-graduate opportunities. NEPSAC programs also allow student-athletes to
continue their development even after graduation. These opportunities are crucial from studentathletes who need to develop both in the classroom and on the basketball court before signing
with a school. It also creates a system that allows for students to conveniently reclassify
according to their basketball aspirations. This reclassification may be evidence that studentathletes are reacting to the barriers presented in the theory of reasoned action. As a result, it is
possible that these top players are evaluating subjective norms earlier then before the age limit
was implemented.
The second factor is caused by the effect that “one-and-done” players have on
sophomore and junior student-athletes. The second questions results suggest that elite high
school student-athletes who are talented enough to be considered as potential picks in the NBA
Draft are staying only a year at the college level and then immediately entering the NBA Draft.
This is evident by the 4.57 decrease of high school players and 4.63 increase in freshman. This is
not a surprise, especially if you look at who these players are. Examples include Anthony Davis,
Michael Kidd-Gilchrist, Kyrie Irving, John Wall, Tyreke Evans, Derek Rose, Kevin Love and
O.J. Mayo. These are all players that could have been lottery selections had they entered the
NBA directly out of high school, but because of the barrier of the age limit, they all played a
single year in college before applying for early entry in the NBA Draft. It would appear the
intended behavior of these elite players is not changing during their year in college. Instead, it
seems that these student-athletes are even more exposed to the descriptive norms of their peers.
This is having a domino effect on the descriptive norms of family, friends, fans and even
coaches.
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The implementation of the rookie salary scale is also playing a factor, as players know
that staying in college will only delay their first opportunity to maximize the earning potential
that is waiting for them on the free agent market. Alternatively, there is evidence that a stigma is
developing in both the NBA and college basketball for players who are still in college by their
senior year. When evaluating college seniors, many discredit their talent and potential based on
the fact that they were not projected high enough to leave college early (Norlander, 2012).
Although this is an unfounded criticism, the third research question examines the ability for
teenage first round selections to reach significant levels of contribution in comparison to first
round selections in their twenties.
Some might suggest that the lopsided results between teenage and over-twenty draftees
reaching these benchmarks, are associated with the best players in a given college class entering
the draft years earlier as teenagers. There are obviously exceptions, as some players take longer
to develop. Generally, prospects with the most NBA potential are the players that are drafted in
the first round or lottery. These statistics show that teenage players are more likely to reach these
benchmarks in their first five years. The age minimum has only widened this gap from 8.56% to
22.92%. This gap helps to explain the trends in the second question. Owners, general managers,
scouts, and coaches are selecting these younger, less-experienced players because they have
higher ceilings, and are more likely to become key contributors.
The NBA determined that the value of these early entrant players was creating liability
concerns for the league. The environment was evolving, and institutional changes were needed to
reverse such an increase. The age minimum was effective in reducing these liabilities with the
younger draft selections. This can only help the future of the NBA, owners and other
stakeholders.
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These numbers also suggest that lottery picks are far more reliable than those selected
later in the draft. This trend is consistent both before and after the age minimum was
implemented. This trend is logical as the most talented players are typically going to be selected
first.
Overall, it was found that the age minimum has not provided the league with a
significantly older draft pool. Drafted players are getting older, but only by an average of nine
days. Additionally, early selections have actually gotten younger. It was also found that the age
minimum has encouraged additional early entry candidates into the draft. The teenage early
entry first round picks are reaching their significant levels of productivity at a much higher rate
than the players who were drafted in the first round at 20 years of age or older. This gap has only
widened since the age minimum was put into place as part of the 2005 CBA. Additionally, teams
are making better decisions on first round players, as the number of fourth-year team options
tendered has increased since the rule change.
Financially, the rookie salary scale solidifies draft salaries so that the age minimum has
little to no effect on the cost of each class. Instead any financial concerns must focus on the
quality of investment. The age minimum eliminated the under-19 category of first round picks
and lottery picks, which was the most expensive age group to develop into contributing players.
This change took a great amount of pressure off both coaches and league executives.
Due to these factors, it was a surprising to see the lack of attention that was paid to the
age minimum during the 2011 CBA, especially after the public relations campaign that David
Stern and the NBA League Office launched in support of raising the age limit to 20 years of age.
Although these issues are highly debated and often speculated about in the media, the financial
ramifications are not significant enough to emphasize them over other major issues up for debate
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over the collective bargaining table. Both parties have focused primarily on the distribution of
the Basketball Related Income.
The lack of attention from key leaders to the age-minimum policy suggests that the NBA
and NBPA are comfortable with the current rules. Given these research findings, it is difficult to
believe that the age minimum has achieved its stated goals, but it is also difficult to believe that
the financial ramifications of further rule changes are enough to lead league executives to
exchange concessions to the NBPA. Examples of these concessions would likely include cap
relief or larger percentage shares of the BRI. Due to these logistics, it is hard to see an extension
or remission of the age minimum, especially since the NBA and NBPA signed a ten-year CBA in
November of 2011. This deal includes a mutual opt out clause after 2017, the seventh year
(Coon, 2011). If it were not for the political barriers associated with the CBA, the NBA could
create a better system for developing talent that is not only better for the NBA but also players
and college programs. The current political climate has created a situation where the NBPA’s
union leaders can only hope to minimize concessions. They are no longer fighting for enhanced
wages, benefits or working conditions (Tellem, 2011).
Proposed NBA Improvements
The age limit should be extended one additional year to 20 years of age and two years
removed from a prospects high school graduation. This extended age limit will provide the
maturity and age difference that was originally intended from the 19 year-old age limit. The age
limit should not have an exception for players who are a year removed from high school
graduation. This extension and rule change would also devalue the trend of reclassification. It
would also provide a two-year window for NBA scouts and executives to evaluate talent. From
the perspective of college athletic programs, continuity among top division-1 rosters should
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improve. From a player’s prospective, these two years in college allow them to both develop
personally, athletically and academically. They can also use college athletics as a tool to generate
popularity that can translate to brand equity if they reach the NBA. These rule changes would
likely have a significant effect on the injunctive and subjective norms affecting these elite level
players. The research results suggest that behavioral intention would remain unchanged at least
after the first college season.
From the perspective of the league, an extra season of talent evaluation will help to cut
down on potential personnel mistakes that are inevitable throughout the draft process. Since each
team’s annual salaries are between 50 and 100 million dollars respectively, the league stands to
save itself millions of dollars. These revenue discrepancies will come from the savings that can
be attributed to more reliable talent investments, as well as the increase in value that these
rookies are likely to provide (Kerr, 2012).
It is crucial for the NBA to recognize the fact that the institution of the traditional college
experience is not for everyone, and that includes many aspiring NBA players. Prospects with a
strong behavioral intention to play professional basketball might be less likely to find success in
a higher education setting. Players who do not intend to commit themselves to a full-time
academic schedule should be pushed towards alternative paths of basketball development. This
change should reduce some of the pressure that lead to corruption of NCAA rules when the 2005
CBA enacted the age limit. By 2008, numerous one-and-done selections had already left their
respective schools with NCAA sanctions. Derek Rose, John Calipari, and the University of
Memphis received sanctions for a violation regarding the SAT, which is one of the standardized
tests that is required for student-athletes to acquire NCAA eligibility. OJ Mayo, Tim Floyd and
USC also received NCAA sanctions in a pay-for-play scenario (Garcia, 2009). The
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improvement of alternative development paths for potential NBA prospects will be absolutely
crucial if the age limit is extended an additional year (Kerr, 2012).
The best way to create this alternative path while keeping North America’s best talent in
the U.S and Canada is to build the D-League into a traditional minor league. The D-League is a
minor league system that was developed and cultivated by David Stern. The NBA financially
supports the league. This alternative path will provide opportunities for those who are not
interested in a college education. In recent years, the league has continued to add franchises.
NBA teams are starting to buy exclusively affiliated franchises.
In this proposal, it is imperative that this trend continues before the renewal of the CBA
in ten years. This system will only be effective if each franchise has a D-League affiliate. It is
believed that this was David Stern’s original vision when he started the league. Since the league
primarily operates in leased stadiums and operations are controlled at the franchise level. As a
result, operational costs are relatively insubstantial. D-League player salaries are very low and in
comparison to the finances associated with risky draft picks. Traditionally, the league has paid
the salary of each individual player instead of the respective teams. This system will need to
change, even if the NBA subsidizes these salaries through teams instead of the D-league.
In the last couple of years, teams have selected college basketball players in the second
round and placed them in leagues overseas for continued development. These were players that
current NBA D-League contracts were not able to entice. Two of the best examples are the
Detroit Pistons sending Kyle Singler, the 33rd pick, to CB Lucentum Alicante and Real Madrid
in Spain’s top league and the Timberwolves sending Robbie Hummel, the 58 pick, to Obradoiro
CAB (Blusens Monbus) in Spain. As former GM and NBA player Steve Kerr recently said in a
Grantland article, “If an 18-year-old basketball whiz wants to earn a living right away, he could
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play overseas or in the D-League for those two years. Regardless, it shouldn't be the NBA's
responsibility to provide working opportunities for teenagers, just like it's not the NFL's
responsibility to do so. The NBA should only care about running its operation the best it can.
That's it” (Kerr, 2012).
The MLB and NHL are able to subsidize the costs affiliated with running minor leagues
by extending the amount of time that a player has to wait to reach free agency. For example,
players in baseball must be in the majors for six years before they reach free agency.
The NBA has been hesitant to enter into D-League conversation with the NBPA. The 12page proposal that the NBPA finally agreed to as the resolution of the 2011 CBA did not
mention the D-League in any context (Beck, 2011).
Research Limitations
A primary limitation to this research was the limited access of advanced statistical
metrics. If efficiency statistics had been available for each of the last fifteen years, they would
have been worked into the statistical evaluation of player contributions.
Another one of the primary limitations to these statistical analyses was the sample size of
career paths demonstrated in the third research question. Only two of the classes that were
drafted after the age minimum was implemented have completed the first five years of their
careers. After additional seasons, a more complete analysis on these draft classes will be
available.
A second limitation is the determination of what is representative of a draft class. A
determination had to be made to specifically analyze selected players, or to analyze all players
who applied for entry in to the draft. An original determination had been made that all players
who applied for the draft would be the most representative of a draft class. Unfortunately,
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college seniors are automatically eligible for the draft. This adds thousands of players to the
potential draft pool. In an attempt to be consistent, a decision to use only players that were
selected in the draft was made.
In the third analysis a decision to use only first round selections was made, as many
second round selections never play a minute in the NBA (Basketball-Reference Database, 2012).
Additionally, many players that are drafted in the second round spend some time in the DLeague (Basketball-Reference database, 2012).
Another limitation with this data is that the seven years before the rule change cannot be
seen as a consistent baseline sample. The age of draftees during this period varied quite
significantly. Although results are inconsistent from year to year, these numbers are clearly
decreasing from year to year.
A final limitation was the classification of draft entrants. A United States national player
like Brandon Jennings is classified as an internationally developed player as he played in Italy
after high school, while a foreign player who played college basketball is classified with his
college class. If the purpose of this statistical analysis were to examine international aspects of
the NBA Draft then players would have been classified quite differently.
Future Research Directions
During the attempt to answer these three research questions, many others questions
surfaced. Data surrounding these topics will continue to develop as additional draft classes enter
the NBA and players who have not yet reached their fifth season continue to reach different
levels of contribution. It would be interesting to see these data sets completed after the 20162017 NBA season.
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Any further extension of the age minimum is unlikely due to its absence at the
negotiating table during the drafting of the 2011 CBA. It is likely that the NBA’s eligibility rules
will remain the same for at least another ten years. Meaning that the age limit could be 17-yearsold when it is renegotiated. This is a substantial sample size for conducting before and after
research on the 2005 CBA age minimum implementation.
Now that we know an age minimum does not actually result in a statistically significant
age increase, we need to monitor the age and class level to see if the results from this study differ
significantly in upcoming years. Does a trend of younger and less experienced draft pools
continue? Are additional players’ elite level prospects forgoing their junior year of high school as
part of reclassifying in order to enter the NBA at the same age that they otherwise would?
One thing is certain: private and public debates over the age limit will continue until
2021, and even then many will disagree with whatever draft entry rules are collectively
bargained. The economic and political conditions will determine whether or not the age
minimum is once again brought into the forefront of collective bargaining negotiations. With the
exception of the 2011 CBA, the NBPA has continued to give concessions to owners in hopes of
maintaining a favorable balance of the BRI. The two parties have discussed the formation of a
committee that would continue to monitor age eligibility issues going forward (Wojnarowski,
2011). Any agreement would need to be an amendment to the current CBA.
Findings like the data presented in this study will have a minimal effect on the league’s
approach to draft eligibility. As stated above, the NBA’s motivation seems to have more to do
with quality of player investments, competitive balance and the leagues image then the age,
maturity or development of players. In other words, they do not want to improve player
development, they just want to better select the players that are more likely to develop. Quite
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simply, they are looking to minimize the risk and maximize the reward in regards to the draft
process.
David Stern’s concern of the leagues image also presents an interesting opportunity to
further investigate the socioeconomically structures of the NBA and the role that it plays
regarding the implementation of the age minimum. An analysis of collectively bargained rules
would be a great metric for the evaluation of these socioeconomic structures. Similar research
has been conducted using the age requirement in women’s professional tennis to explain
socioeconomic structures (Rodenberg & Stone, 2010).

Conclusion
These research findings are important because they provide an explanation of the results
associated with the age limit. It can be suggested that the NBA owners are not concerned about
the strength of college basketball. It seems that they are also not interested in obtaining a more
mature draft pool. These findings seem to show that the NBA is more interested in creating a
system that allows top-level decision makers the opportunity to see each and every eligible draft
candidate for an entire season at either the collegiate or international level. This process allows
owners to draft players who are going on to develop at a more reliable rate. The age minimum is
relieving owners of one of their biggest liabilities. The way that the NBA’s competitive balance
is structured places a great importance on successful early lottery selections. With so few
opportunities for acquiring talent, wasted opportunities are devastating, especially for small
market franchises who are less likely to attract proven free agents. The data suggests that even
top picks are not guaranteed to reach their potential. The age limit was an indirect attempt to
influence the leagues competitive balance and especially helping small market franchises.
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Between 1997 and 2003, only 80% of first picks had at least one superstar season, compared to
40% of second picks, 30% of third picks and 20% of fifth picks (Groothuis, Hill & Perri, 2009).
They likely saw that the contributing factors that influence early entry behavior were
overwhelmingly leading players to make the transition earlier and earlier. The age minimum was
the easiest way to inhibit this behavior.
The proposal above aims at furthering the NBA’s initiative to improve the league’s
ability to scout potential early draft entrant, as well as their collective image. The proposals
provide relatively simple changes that should produce numerous benefits for the high school,
college and professional organizations basketball association, as well as high school, college and
professional athletes and their coaches. These changes were aimed at alleviating some of the
pressures that have led to a chain of corruption throughout all levels of basketball. They stem
from the three original research questions that identified that there has been little change to the
overall age of players drafted after the implementation of the age minimum, and lottery picks
actually have gotten significantly younger since the CBA change. The second research question
identified that the reason for these unexpected numbers can be attributed to a substantial increase
in the amount of early entrants being drafted. Last, data collection was designed to find out how
these new draft classes were faring compared to their counterparts, and it was found that teenage
selections were actually developing more reliably than players drafted in their twenties, although
they are slightly more expensive to prepare to contribute at the NBA level. It also found that
draft selections were reaching a level of significant contribution at a higher rate. This
improvement can be contributed to teams benefiting from the ability to scout all prospects for at
least a year while they are playing in college or playing in another professional league. The
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proposals serve as an extension of the age limit and tweaks to a capitalist system that served as a
development system to the NBA since the league’s inception as the BAA.
These results show a conflict between numerous factors that seem to indicate an
increasing incentive for early entry candidates, and a barrier preventing immediate entry. The
age minimum has been an effective barrier to entry; its contribution has clearly affected the
subjective and injunctive norms toward additional early entrants even while the collective
behavior intention is unaffected after mandatory time in college basketball. This combination of
factors has resulted in ages that have remained statistically consistent.
The results also reflect the type of continual evolution that collectively bargained league
rules represent. Early on-court results suggest that some of the NBA’s largest player
development liabilities have been eliminated. Age eligibility rules will continue to be monitored
by both the NBPA and the owners. Consistent with Institution Theory, the evolution of the
external environment will determine what future changes the owners will seek.
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Appendix I
Table 5
2012-2013 NBA Rookie Salary Scale (Lottery Picks)
Pick

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

QO

1

$4,286,900

$4,479,800

$4,672,700

26.10%

30.00%

2

$3,835,600

$4,008,200

$4,180,800

26.20%

30.50%

3

$3,444,400

$3,599,400

$3,754,400

26.40%

31.20%

4

$3,105,500

$3,245,200

$3,385,000

26.50%

31.90%

5

$2,812,200

$2,938,700

$3,065,300

26.70%

32.60%

6

$2,554,200

$2,669,100

$2,784,100

26.80%

33.40%

7

$2,331,700

$2,436,600

$2,541,600

27.00%

34.10%

8

$2,136,100

$2,232,200

$2,328,300

27.20%

34.80%

9

$1,963,600

$2,052,000

$2,140,300

27.40%

35.50%

10

$1,865,300

$1,949,200

$2,033,200

27.50%

36.20%

11

$1,772,100

$1,851,800

$1,931,600

32.70%

36.90%

12

$1,683,500

$1,759,300

$1,835,000

37.80%

37.60%

13

$1,599,300

$1,671,300

$1,743,200

42.90%

38.30%

14

$1,519,400

$1,587,800

$1,656,100

48.10%

39.10%

Note. Data collected from Basketball-Reference.com
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Appendix II
Section 1: Player Eligibility as it is Stated in the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement
(a) No player may sign a Contract or play in the NBA unless he has been eligible for selection in at least one (1)
NBA Draft. No player shall be eligible for selection in more than two (2) NBA Drafts.
(b) A player shall be eligible for selection in the first NBA Draft with respect to which he has satisfied all applicable
requirements of Section 1(b)(i) below and one of the requirements of Section 1(b)(ii) below:
(i) The player (A) is or will be at least 19 years of age during the calendar year in which the Draft is held, and (B)
with respect to a player who is not an international player (defined below), at least one (1) NBA Season has elapsed
since the player’s graduation from high school (or, if the player did not graduate from high school, since the
graduation of the class with which the player would have graduated had he graduated from high school); and
(ii)
(A) The player has graduated from a four-year college or university in the United States (or is to graduate in the
calendar year in which the Draft is held) and has no remaining intercollegiate basketball eligibility; or
(B) The player is attending or previously attended a four-year college or university in the United States, his original
class in such college or university has graduated (or is to graduate in the calendar year in which the Draft is held),
and he has no remaining intercollegiate basketball eligibility; or
(C) The player has graduated from high school in the United States, did not enroll in a four-year college or
university in the United States, and four calendar years have elapsed since such player’s high school graduation; or
(D) The player did not graduate from high school in the United States, and four calendar years have elapsed since
the graduation of the class with which the player would have graduated had he graduated from high school; or
(E) The player has signed a player contract with a “professional basketball team not in the NBA” (defined below)
that is located anywhere in the world, and has rendered services under such contract prior to the Draft; or
(F) The player has expressed his desire to be selected in the Draft in a writing received by the NBA at least sixty
(60) days prior to such Draft (an “Early Entry” player); or
(G) If the player is an “international player” (defined below), and notwithstanding anything contained in subsections
(A) through (F) above:
(1) The player is or will be twenty-two (22) years of age during the calendar year of the Draft; or
(2) The player has signed a player contract with a “professional basketball team not in the NBA” (defined below)
that is located in the United States, and has rendered services under such contract prior to the Draft; or
(3) The player has expressed his desire to be selected in the Draft in a writing received by the NBA at least sixty
(60) days prior to such Draft (an “Early Entry” player).
(c) For purposes of this Article X, an “international player” is a player: (i) who has maintained a permanent
residence outside of the United States for at least the three (3) years prior to the Draft, while participating in the
game of basketball as an amateur or as a professional outside of the United States; (ii) who has never previously
enrolled in a college or university in the United States; and (iii) who did not complete high school in the United
States.
(d) For purposes of this Article X, a “professional basketball team not in the NBA” means any team that pays
money or compensation of any kind – in excess of a stipend for living expenses – to a basketball player for
rendering services to such team.

(2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2012)
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Appendix III
Table 6
Players Drafted by Class (1999-2012)
Year

HS

INT

FR

SO

JR

SR

Total

1999

2

6

2

6

6

36

58

2000

2

10

3

9

6

28

58

2001

5

7

6

10

8

21

57

2002

1

14

2

5

13

22

57

2003

4

21

2

3

6

22

58

2004

8

15

3

2

8

23

59

2005

9

14

1

7

11

18

60

2006

0

16

2

9

13

20

60

2007

0

13

8

5

14

20

60

2008

0

12

12

9

8

19

60

2009

0

14

4

8

13

21

60

2010

0

7

10

12

13

18

60

2011

0

12

7

8

14

19

60

2012

0

9

9

13

8

21

60

Note. Data collected from Basketball-Reference.com
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Table 7
Percent of Players Drafted by Class (1999-2012)
Year

HS

INT

FR

SO

JR

SR

1999

3.4%

10.3%

3.4%

10.3%

10.3%

62.1%

2000

3.4%

17.2%

5.2%

15.5%

10.3%

48.3%

2001

8.8%

12.3%

10.5%

17.5%

14.0%

36.8%

2002

1.8%

24.6%

3.5%

8.8%

22.8%

38.6%

2003

6.9%

36.2%

3.4%

5.2%

10.3%

37.9%

2004

13.6%

25.4%

5.1%

3.4%

13.6%

39.0%

2005

15.0%

23.3%

1.7%

11.7%

18.3%

30.0%

2006

0.0%

26.7%

3.3%

15.0%

21.7%

33.3%

2007

0.0%

21.7%

13.3%

8.3%

23.3%

33.3%

2008

0.0%

20.0%

20.0%

15.0%

13.3%

31.7%

2009

0.0%

23.3%

6.7%

13.3%

21.7%

35.0%

2010

0.0%

11.7%

16.7%

20.0%

21.7%

30.0%

2011

0.0%

20.0%

11.7%

13.3%

23.3%

31.7%

2012

0.0%

15.0%

15.0%

21.7%

13.3%

35.0%

Note. Data collected from Basketball-Reference.com
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Table 8

Change by College Class
HS

INT

FR

SO

JR

SR

1999-2005 Average

7.62%

21.38%

4.67%

10.32%

14.25%

41.77%

2006-2012 Average

0.00

19.76%

12.38%

15.24%

19.76%

32.86%

Percent Change

-7.62%

-1.61%

7.71%

4.92%

5.51%

-8.91%

Standardized Change

-4.57

-0.97

4.63

2.95

3.31

-5.35

Note. Data collected from Basketball-Reference.com
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Appendix VIII
Table 9
Percentage of First Round Picks Reaching Above Average Levels of Contribution by Draft Class
Under-19

Under-20

Over-20

Draft

Total $ U19

Average

Ratio

Total $ U20

Average

Ratio

Total $ 20+

Average

Ratio

1999

$19,083,465.00

$6,361,155.00

1 of 3

$25,555,425.00

$3,650,775.00

4 of 7

$42,423,056.00

$1,928,320.73

7 of 11

2000

$2,670,720.00

$1,335,360.00

2 of 2

$6,145,337.00

$2,048,445.67

2 of 3

$74,693,937.00

$2,994,047.19 17 of 26

2001

$25,175,124.00

$6,293,781.00

3 of 4

$34,774,084.00

$4,346,760.50

5 of 7

$43,926,979.00

$2,196,348.95 11 of 21

2002

$0.00

$0.00

1 of 1

$17,174,679.36

$2,862,446.56

5 of 6

$67,497,058.07

$3,068,048.09 12 of 22

2003

$26,170,328.00

$5,234,065.60

4 of 5

$31,705,654.00

$3,963,206.75

7 of 9

$57,402,501.00

$2,733,452.43 14 of 20

2004

$21,694,924.00

$2,711,865.50

7 of 8

$40,027,317.00

$3,079,024.38 10 of 13

$43,009,806.00

$4,884,536.65 11 of 16

2005

$18,715,277.00

$3,743,055.40

2 of 5

$18,715,277.00

$2,673,611.00

$62,531,622.00

$2,718,766.17 15 of 23

Total

$16,215,691.14

$3,668,468.93

$55,926,422.72

$2,931,931.46 87 of 139

20 of 28 $24,871,110.48

4 of 7

$3,232,038.55 37 of 52

71.43%

71.15%

62.59%

2006

-

-

-

$11,742,000.00

$3,914,000.00

3 of 3

$116,465,045.00 $4,479,424.81 11 of 27

2007

-

-

-

$23,555,912.00

$2,617,323.56

6 of 9

$73,579,632.00

$3,503,792.00 14 of 21

Total

-

-

-

$17,648,956

$3,265,661.78

9 of 12

$95,022,338.50

$3,991,608.40 25 of 48

Note. Data collected from Basketball-Reference.com
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Appendix IX
Table 10
Percentage of First Round Picks Reaching Above Average Levels of Contribution by Draft Class
Under-19

Under-20

Over-20

Draft

Total $ U19

Average

Ratio

Total $ U20

Average

Ratio

Total $ 20+

Average

Ratio

1999

$16,168,785.00

$16,168,785.00

0 of 1

$22,640,745.00

$5,660,186.25

2 of 4

$14,792,400.00

$1,479,240.00

8 of 10

2000

$0.00

$0.00

1 of 1

$0.00

$0.00

1 of 1

$47,136,016.00

$3,625,847.38

9 of 13

2001

$27,186,204.00

$5,437,240.80

3 of 4

$27,186,204.00

$5,437,240.80

4 of 5

$18,705,950.00

$5,437,240.80

7 of 9

2002

$0.00

$0.00

1 of 1

$17,174,679.36

$3,434,935.87

5 of 5

$24,837,020.63

$2,759,668.96

8 of 9

2003

$16,815,062.00

$8,407,531.00

2 of 2

$16,815,062.00

$4,203,765.50

4 of 4

$17,227,706.00

$1,722,770.60 10 of 10

2004

$20,087,524.00

$4,017,504.80

4 of 5

$30,587,757.00

$3,823,469.63

6 of 8

$18,591,436.00

$8,683,572.67

4 of 6

2005

$10,791,720.00

$3,597,240.00

2 of 3

$10,791,720.00

$2,697,930.00

3 of 4

$24,332,492.00

$2,433,249.20

7 of 10

Total

$13,007,042.14

$5,375,471.66

$23,660,431.52

$3,734,512.80 53 of 67

13 of 17 $17,885,166.77

$3,608,218.29 25 of 31

76.47%

Percent

80.65%

79.10%

2006

-

-

-

$6,766,080.00

$3,383,040.00

2 of 2

$54,868,755.00

$4,572,396.25

8 of 12

2007

-

-

-

$19,411,232.00

$2,773,033.14

6 of 7

$22,937,904.00

$3,276,843.43

5 of 7

Total

-

-

-

$13,088,656.00

$3,078,036.57

8 of 9

$38,903,329.50

$3,924,619.84 13 of 19

88.89%

Percent
Note. Data collected from Basketball-Reference.com
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68.42%

